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The use of pharmaceuticals cognitive enhancers (PCE) has been stirring growing interest,
not only in the scientific domain but also in the popular media, and has probably had some
increase recently in academic, professional and military quarters. So this phenomenon is
deemed as a normal procedure aimed at improving the performance of an individual as
well as the overall standards of an organization. Although the vast majority of countries
have some kind of restrictions to reduce the wide non-medical usage of PCE, these can
be overcome quite easily. In arguing for our explicit claim that, in many contexts, the use
of cognitive enhancers should be disclosed—as a moral and socially relevant duty—we
maintain that PCE present typical, or at least not rare, properties. The features are the
following: (a) the enhancer has acute and/or chronic effects. In the first case, shortly after
taking the drug the performance is significantly better than average; in the second case,
there is a growing or lasting effect, which, however, is poised to diminish when one stops
taking the drug; (b) those effects are significant (there is a difference in the outcome
considered between taking and not taking the drug) and sometimes dramatic; and (c) a
third feature, not directly related to enhancers as such, is their varying safety, availability,
and legal permissibility, which might either induce people to take them or refrain them
from doing so. We will consider the issue of fairness due to “unenhanced” people as well
as the potentially dysfunctional social consequences of an undisclosed PCE use.
Keywords: pharmaceutical cognitive enhancers, privacy, fairness, autonomy, performance-enhancing substances,
moral duty, social duty
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the use of pharmaceuticals cognitive enhancers
(PCE) has been stirring growing interest, not only in the scientific
domain but also in the popular media, and has probably had
some increase in academic, professional and military quarters,
although such increase is very difficult to assess (McCabe
et al., 2005, 2007; Teter et al., 2005; Sahakian and Morein-
Zamir, 2007; Russo et al., 2008; Franke et al., 2014). PCE
can be tentatively defined as drugs which have been shown to
improve to some degree some features of human cognition,
namely attention, executive functioning (planning, inhibition,
and problem-solving), memory and learning, via altering specific
neurotransmitters. The most investigated and probably used PEC
are off-label drugs primarily aimed at treating neurodegenerative
diseases, ADHD, or narcolepsy, which are taken by the healthy to
enhance their performance (Greely et al., 2008; Lanni et al., 2008;
Marchant et al., 2009; Advokat and Scheithauer, 2013; Mereu
et al., 2013; Sattler et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2013; Urban and
Gao, 2014) across university campuses (Babcock and Byrne, 2000;
Shillington et al., 2006; DeSantis et al., 2008; here we talk about
“academic doping”, see Cakic, 2009) as well as other competitive
contexts (Sahakian and Morein-Zamir, 2007; Chandler, 2012).
For reason of space, arguments related to the current restrictions
in place (Smith and Farah, 2011) concerning the purchase of
these “smart drugs” (Mehlman, 2004)1—and their very limited
impact—(Farah et al., 2004; Herman-Stahl et al., 2007) will not
be discussed here. Instead, this paper aims at analyzing a specific
problem related to PCE use. In particular, it is our goal to
show the tension between the local effect (the enhancement of
the individual performance) and the global effects (the unwanted
social results deriving from the spreading of the use of PCE).
Those effects are to be related to two distinct concepts, which— in
that case—are at odds: (1) autonomy, and consequently privacy,
due to people in their choice of enhancing themselves; and
(2) fairness, which is a socially appreciated value. In the following
sections we shall considered them separately, starting with the
former and later considering its implications on the latter.
LOCAL EFFECT AS PRIVACY
In arguing for our explicit claim that the use of cognitive
enhancers should be disclosed, we maintain that such enhancers
1Maxwell Mehlman provides a useful account of the use, effects and contexts
of these drugs (Mehlman, 2004).
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present typical, or at least not rare, properties. The features are
the following: (a) the enhancer has acute and/or chronic effects.
In the first case, shortly after taking the drug the performance
is significantly better than average; in the second case, there
is a growing or lasting effect, which, however, is poised to
diminish when one stops taking the drug; and (b) those effects
are significant (the outcome is different depending on whether
the drug was taken or not) and sometimes dramatic; (c) a third
feature, not directly related to enhancers as such, is their varying
safety, availability, and legal permissibility, which might either
induce people to take them or refrain them from doing so. Some
recent review studies (Lucke et al., 2011; Smith and Farah, 2011)
show that a number of scholars are inclined to say that today’s
enhancers present those features in a small percentage. Yet, recent
developments in the public acknowledgement of PCE use in
workplaces put doubts over the accuracy of these statements.2
Since some scholars argue that current enhancers have little
effect on cognition, it is helpful to highlight their overall effects.
A recent qualitative study conducted by Scott Vrecko showed
that Ritalin and Adderall do affect intellectual capacities (such
as executive functions, working memory and information
process), but they also heavily affect the user’s emotional
states. “Such alterations appear to be an important dimension
of the drug effects that users perceive to enable improved
academic performance” (Vrecko, 2013). Participants said that the
perception of better emotional or affective states was the most
important feature of the enhancers, leading to improvements
in the sense of having augmented skills in doing academic
work. Emotional dynamics are a salient dimension of the use of
stimulant-based medications. Altered emotional states caused
by cognitive enhancers are “part of what makes stimulant drugs
useful in relation to academic work”. This explains why the
specifically cognitive effect appears limited. Instead, Ritalin and
Adderall have an important action on the dopaminergic system:
they affect the attention, the system of pleasure and that of
emotions, including a euphoric effect (Racine and Forlini, 2010;
Volkow et al., 2012). Therefore, if, as it seems, enhancers are
increasingly spreading among intellectual professionals, it means
that the users expect a positive and significant effect, at least at
the level of subjective perception. Yet, even though research in the
field is at the outset, psychostimulants seem to have very complex,
dose and context-dependent effects (Konrad et al., 2004; Wood
et al., 2013). The role of age, gender, and ethnic groups in drug
efficacy is not clear as well, and such factors play a role in creating
differences in neurotransmitter systems of individuals. Thus, the
effectivity of PCE is deemed to be unreliable. People relying on
PCE for their ordinary or extraordinary performances cannot
adequately assess the effects of taking different doses of PCE in
different contexts and they would often think they are better than
they actually are. And that turns in further reason for disclosing
the use of PCE beyond those we expose below.
There are no doubts however, that one of the issues that
appear more problematic about the idea of disclosing one’s use
2In a recent interview for example, an Australian Public Servant admitted that
in May 2014 there was an extensive (and widespread) use of modafinil in order
to complete the Federal Budget on time (Farr, 2014).
of PCE is that of entering the private sphere of one’s (moral)
conduct. As Warren and Brandeis famously put it (Warren and
Brandeis, 1890), privacy is part of a more general right to
immunity of the person and—through the principle of “inviolate
personality”—it preserves a space of non-interference by others.
The right to privacy seems to suggest that creating publicly
embarrassing or accusatory situations against the individual
should not be tolerated (Prosser, 1960). The enhancement of
individual performances through legal drugs seems to pertain
to such a scenario. If we are to accept a “public intrusion”
in such a choice of lifestyle, it is thus necessary to provide a
counterbalancing moral reason that could legitimize the request
for a disclosure of such information. When is it possible to
identify, then, a moral duty or a social interest that goes against
individual privacy in the case of PCE? We shall look into this
question in the next section.
GLOBAL EFFECTS AS UNFAIRNESS
Interestingly, indeed, it has been recently suggested that PCE
might represent a shortcut to the redistribution of (cognitive)
wealth (Kohn, 2014). Starting from another study conducted by
Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) (in which they underlined that
external inputs related to the participants’ income substantially
affect their cognitive response in the experiment), Marek Kohn
argues that—while not being an ideal solution—taking a pill
to reduce the impact of the external variables related to the
contingent economical disparities between individuals might
be the way to go. We will focus on fairness in competitive
contexts. As we shall see, in general those situations are such
that some researchers, workers or students who use PCE can
be considered more skilled and better at performing their task
than they really are. But this is not the main problem per se.
The potentially dysfunctional social consequences are due to the
undisclosedness of the PCE use. If one does not have her drug
dose available, she will not be capable of the same performance
as usual and, in some professions, might even put her colleagues
at risk. If standards are set based on PCE-using workers, this
may lead to an organizational dysfunction. Some brief examples
can present realistic scenarios in which the principle of the
duty of disclosure seems perfectly suitable and reasonable. These
examples will highlight the argument for the moral and socially
relevant duty to disclose the use of cognitive enhancers, insofar
as it is sufficiently harmful or unfair to third parties, though not
sufficiently harmful or unfair to justify a legal or organizational
ban.
John and Susan are researchers in the same university
department. They are good friends but are now competing to
get a new position opening up in the department. The university
committee has decided to put them to a test to prepare for which
they are given 2 weeks off work. What they do not know is
that the committee will be evaluating both the content of their
answers, and the time they will take to complete the test. John
chooses to take a 15-mg Adderall tablet, so as to increase his
capacity to concentrate and maximize the efforts of his studies.
To be fair to Susan, he offers her the same tablet, but she refuses,
claiming that it would be unfair to alter her performance for
the sole purpose of passing the test. In the end, John gets the
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job. Although he gave one correct answer less than Susan, he
did so in a much shorter time, and so the committee opted for
him: they want knowledge, but also efficiency. In discovering
this, Susan regards the results as clearly unfair: had she taken
Adderall as well—she believes—her reaction time in answering
the questions would have been comparable to John’s. In this way,
she would have won for the higher number of correct answers.
She thus approaches John urging him to publicly acknowledge
that he took Adderall before the test. He refuses to do so for
two reasons: first, he did give her the chance to have “completely
equal” starting conditions, it was only her choice not to take the
tablet. Second, there is no official requirement to acknowledge
the use of any legal substance: why did she not state that she
had three coffees that morning?3 Susan objects that, first, the
starting conditions would have been unfair in any case because—
unless they decided to take Adderall for the rest of their lives—
their performance would still not correspond to their real, normal
capacities. Second, coffee is well known by the committee, and
they probably assume that people under examination would take
some. On the contrary, Adderall’s effects are little known, and they
vary for each person.
Now consider Robert. He wishes to help his community and
has decided to become a professional nurse in the emergency unit
of the local hospital. As he approaches the day of the entrance
test, he becomes more and more nervous: he knows that if he
could only concentrate fully during the written test, he would have
a very good chance to pass. He is told by a friend that Ritalin,
a legal drug, would increase his alertness, so he decides to give
it a try. On the day of the test, he takes his “smart pill” and
enters the room of the written exam. After having performed in
a way that he deems very close to perfect, he discovers that the
practical test is going to follow in 1 h. Given that he still has
a few pills left, he takes another one. Even in this context, he
can tell that his performance has improved. In line with what he
expected, Robert is accepted as a nurse in the emergency unit.
Wanting to “help more”, however, he decides that he will take
Ritalin regularly when in service. He does so for 6 months, until
he runs out of tablets. This happens just on the evening when the
local stadium in town crumples down. At both the psychological
and the psychical level, Robert is shaken by this “deprivation”
and his colleagues have to help him stay focused a few times
during the night: this has never happened before. Luckily the
wounded are taken care of properly and in a relatively short time,
and Robert’s “under-performance” does not cause any particular
damage. However, his boss notices the change and asks him
what happened. Having a clean conscience and thinking he had
done nothing wrong, Robert tells the truth. His boss is extremely
angry at his words: notwithstanding the moral questionability of
taking PCE for the tests, the main issue is that he needs to know
who can perform what, and under what circumstances. They are
dealing with life and death: anything preventing him from having
the actual picture of the people working under him potentially
3It should be noted that this argument is often used by bio-liberals: given that
caffeine is also a cognitive enhancing substance, why should we limit the use
of one enhancer over another? For a more precise analysis see Julien (2001),
especially pages 145–164.
jeopardizes the success of their medical assistance. For this reason,
Robert’s boss asks him to resign. Robert is shocked and objects
that he only thought he was going to be more useful, and certainly
he did not perceive this as a “secret”. It simply never came out in a
conversation.4
With short notice, the Ministry of Education occasionally
sample tests high school students. The goal is to assess the
quality of education, in order to have quantitative data to make
comparisons between different towns and regions, identifying
effective methods to improve the performance of both teachers
and students where needed. Let us assume that standardized
student assessment tests are also submitted to those who are old
enough to legally take PCE. Even if the tests are anonymous,
situations could arise in which students take PCE to improve their
results, perhaps encouraged by the teachers themselves, who are
likely to aspire to high rankings for their classes. In this way,
certain classes or schools in certain towns and regions may end
up having very high scores, which, however, would have nothing
to do with the teaching methods used or with the students’
abilities. This would cause evident biases in the interpretation
of the results and lead to inefficient decisions (let us not forget
that we are dealing with sample tests, and that a handful of
classes, picked using statistically valid methods, can be used as
indicators for vast geographic areas). On the basis of the analysis
of the data collected, school authorities may well think that, in
those classes in which students took PCE, the quality of the
education was higher due to the teaching methods used, and
decide to experiment with these methods elsewhere as well. This
would result in a waste of public resources and hinder research
on truly better teaching methods. Additionally, it could hide
actual differences between geographic areas, resulting in a lack of
intervention where school performance is actually poor.
In all the cases considered, there would appear to be both a
moral duty and a social interest in reporting the use of PCE.
Indeed, the use of PCE could be deemed fully legitimate and in
fact, if openly reported, it could become an additional element in
the assessment of ways to improve one’s performance. To focus
on this last case, by knowing what classes, in what geographic
areas, took cognitive enhancers, it will be possible to assess their
effectiveness without introducing biases in the overall results.
This is certainly of social interest as it helps with the efficient
allocation of resources. Yet, there also seems to be a moral
duty, since teachers who encouraged their students to take PCE
without reporting it might be trying to hide their shortcomings as
educators. In other contexts, instead, taking PCE unbeknownst
to evaluators may result in the failure to identify situations of
economic or cultural distress, because school performance has
improved only thanks to the use of cognitive enhancers.
LOCAL VS. GLOBAL EFFECTS
The duty to disclose the use of cognitive enhancers (and maybe
also of mood affecting drugs) is not just intended to prevent local
effects from prevailing on global effects—with undesirable social
4A similar motivation could be applied to the renowned cases of cocaine use
among surgeons around the world. However, our intention is to focus on PCE
precisely because—unlike cocaine—they are not illegal drugs.
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outcomes deriving from unpredictable composition effects. This
is certainly the most important consequentialist reasoning that
can justify the duty of disclosure. What is at stake, however, is
also an ethical principle of fairness that seems to prevail over
the right to privacy as we described it earlier. In fact, those who
make use of cognitive enhancers in single occasions or non-
repeatable competitive situations seem to be required to report
the sudden difference that has arisen in their abilities without this
enhancement depending on something they can be credited for.
Suppose a candidate for a test, on her way to the university, finds
the answer sheet that the examiner has lost from her pocket; or
that the computer on which a test is run is defective and shows
the correct answers together with the questions; or that, even a
single time, one gets help from a renowned scientist in conducting
a difficult experiment (but claiming full credit for it); or that a
junior broker can rely on the advice of a knowledgeable friend
who is well introduced in the sphere of finance.
These are situations in which fairness in the competition is
lost without violating any rules or prohibitions, but in which
the performance has little to do with the actual skills that a
candidate may manifest later and with what he has done to
improve them. Therefore, fairness in respecting the equality of the
starting conditions as a principle of respect for the others leads to
reveal aspects related to chance or to the sporadic and extrinsic
improvement of one’s skills. It is a much needed principle,
weaker than the prohibition to resort to means extraneous to the
competition or the duty to waive potential favorable conditions
(the latter principle would severely limit individual autonomy).
As our first example shows, if all relevant information is made
available, the competition is fair and everyone can choose how to
act within the framework of the existing legislation.
The duty to disclose the use of PCE has a final consequence
that one should consider. We have talked mainly about a moral
duty to disclose, but such a duty could also carry a legal
obligation and a number of consequences. For example, would
that disclosure justify that a person is not hired for a position? We
think that a simple answer is not available. In some cases, the hirer
could judge that the person is perfectly suitable for the position
and the variability of her performance based also on PCE is always
satisfactory. In other cases, if the person’s performance with
PCE is near the lower threshold of the minimum performance,
considering the dose and context-dependent effects, it could be
a risk to rely on her, so the hirer would have good reasons
not to hire her. In light of these considerations, there might be
a question about the effective incentives (perhaps stressing the
moral praiseworthiness of disclosing) to declare the use of PCE.
Such incentives deserve attention, but they cannot be analyzed
here.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper—including the use of realistic examples—
has been to shed light over the existing (but overlooked) tension
between the local and global effects of the use of PCE. Even if
it is perhaps problematic to accept in a liberal society at first,
a partial reduction of our right to privacy might be necessary
in order to preserve the equally important principle of fairness
(as well as social safety and efficiency) that an unregulated use
of PCE could threaten. The legitimacy of this step derives from
other values deeply entrenched in liberal societies, such as the
restriction of individual autonomy if this puts in jeopardy that
of others. Reasons related to equity and social interests, therefore,
can suggest that there is a moral duty to publicly acknowledge
the use of PCE in order to limit the potential damages. There
have already been a number of scientific and moral assessments
of PCE in the literature, and we do not expect to have provided
an exhaustive account on how to legislate further on PCE with
this work, but we do hope to have offered some innovative ways
of conceptualizing the debate evolving around the increasing
use of PCE.
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